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The Lomé’s in economic context 
Whither now ?
By Reginald Herbold GREEN
To Plan is to choose 
Choose to go forward. 
-  Julius K. Nyerere
a luta continua
(the struggle continues)
The Lomé (ACP/EEC) Conventions are political economic instru­
mentalities. Each was negotiated in particular global, ACP and 
EEC economic contexts which played a major role in shaping 
them. The 1988-90 negotiations toward’s ‘Lomé IV’ take place in 
an altered context. What does this imply for priorities and possi­
bilities ? This is the subject of Lomé Briefing No 1, which sets the 
scene for the other, more specific Briefings.
Before addressing the question directly it may be useful to cast a 
brief retrospective glance at the contexts and outcomes of the 
first three Lomé negotiations.
A Convention of the past 
(from 1974-75 to 1983-85)
In 1974-75 the global economy was passing through a period of 
high real oil and grain prices preceded by high real prices of 
other commodities. Both ACP and EEC economies were in reces­
sion and the demands for a New International Economic Order 
(to achieve marginal redistribution of the gains of the 1945-70 
International Economic Order) were at their height. EEC states 
were concerned about market and commodity supply access and 
ACP about market access, commodity export earnings stability 
and real resource transfers.
Lomé I sought to address these issues in a formal Convention 
among equals. It provided fairly free, preferential market access 
(except for temporate agricultural products), STABEX to smooth 
commodity export earnings and real resource transfers to the 
ACP, all within an institutional framework and with ‘safeguards’ 
managed by EEC.
By 1977-80 the global economic crisis had subsided (temporari­
ly) as had (terminally) the force of the drive for a New Interna- 
iional Economic Order. The EEC was much less concerned about 
com m od ity  supply or price problems and increasingly viewed
ACP markets as marginal. The ACP, in most cases, had achie­
ved economic recovery (1976-80 was Sub-Saharan A frica ’s half 
decade of most rapid growth). Hence, they were not desperate. 
As a result Lomé II was very little changed from Lomé I formally 
(although real per capita resource transfers to ACP were redu­
ced by about 40 % since Nigeria which had not been a recipient 
in Lomé I began to draw on Lomé aid).
The 1983-85 Lomé negotiations followed the 1980-83 depres­
sion in the North and were shadowed by the continued econo­
mic depressions and socio-political crises of most ACP states. 
The EEC side wished to define economic reform in ACP states 
and to divert additional ACP production to domestic or intra ACP 
markets. The ACP side desperately needed additional net re­
source transfers to loosen the import capacity nooses strangling 
dozens of their economies (not only in Sub-Saharan Africa).
Lomé III has perhaps halted the real per capita resource trans­
fer decline through the European Development Fund (EDF) and 
has markedly upgraded support for intra-ACP economic coope­
ration. It reorganised resource allocation to five year sectoral 
country (and in three cases regional) programming following 
policy dialogue. In addition, it formally introduced human rights 
as a serious area of mutual concern -  notably in respect to 
South African apartheid and destructive engagement against 
ACP members.
Opportunity or disaster: crisis as context
The economic environment in which ‘Lomé IV’ is being negotia­
ted is very different from that surrounding previous negotiations. 
The sharp deterioration in the external circumstances of most 
ACP states calls into question whether the existing Lomé in­
struments are still relevant to the problems being faced, howe-
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ver effective they may have been in the past. What is feasible 
given the current economic situation in Europe ? And what is 
needed given the state of the ACP ?
The EEC states have seen consistent, if slow, economic expan­
sion in recent years, and have a large surplus on their collective 
external trade account. They see a need to bolster the growth 
in world trade and to reduce major external imbalances as key
factors in any strategy to sustain their own growth. Hence, they 
have the means and the desire to introduce into Lomé reforms 
that could ease the economic plight of many ACP states.
With a handful of exceptions, the ACP states all face a series of 
profound crises that have been growing at least since 1980. 
Whereas Lomé I was signed following a period of rising commo­
dity prices, Lomé IV’ follows a profound and continuing col­
lapse in primary product prices and a severe worsening of the 
ACP’s terms of trade. The imports of Africa, for example, when 
expressed in current dollar terms have fallen every year since 
1981. As a result, Africa's share of total Third World imports 
has dropped by almost one-third. In 1981 Africa accounted for 
14.9%  of imports by developing countries; by 1986 this share 
had fallen to 10.5 %.
This drop in imports has been a result of poor export perfor­
mance and an external debt that is unmanageable (as well as 
being unserviceable through any policies that are consistent with 
a recovery in per capita economic growth). The result has been 
a vicious circle of ‘import strangulation'. Manufacturing indus­
try that is dependent upon imported inputs has been working at 
only a fraction of capacity, and even agriculture has been hit 
badly by shortages of fertilisers, pesticides, fuel and spare parts 
for transport and for processing, and of goods in the shops to 
encourage farmers to grow more food for sale. The net result 
has been a sharp fall in average household real income, in 
access to basjc services (leading to a decline in human in­
vestment) and an increase in the number of households living 
in absolute poverty and malnutrition.
A majority of ACP states have launched major efforts to under­
take strategic reconstruction and structural adjustment. These
have required great political courage and determination on the 
part of governments. Yet few are succeeding and many have 
collapsed. The inherent difficulties in achieving such profound 
changes in economic structure have been greatly exacerbated by 
the deterioration of the external environment in which structural 
adjustment has been attempted, not least the decline in terms 
of trade and stagnation in net resource transfers reducing both 
total resources and import capacity.
lf_Tomé IV’ is^to be effective it must address the following 
key issue: How can the European Community (EC) best assist the 
ACP to overcome the external constraint on their domestic policies 
required to break out of the vicious circle of economic decline into 
which they have entered? An important part of any policies that 
address this question must be an increase in the flow of real 
resources from the EC to the ACP. This can be achieved both 
by increasing the size the EDF and by accelerating disburse­
ment, including that of balances from earlier EDFs.
At a time when well-conceived development efforts are being un­
dermined by ‘import strangulation' the centrality of the ‘project 
approach’ to aid is questionable. If a rural development project 
cannot operate effectively through an acute shortage of vehicles 
and fuel, it is clear that a first priority must be to break the im­
port capacity log jam.
Article 188 provides the Lomé Convention with a clear mandate 
to take a lead in easing the import bottleneck. The objective of 
such aid is specifically ‘to contribute to the optimum functioning 
of the productive sectors of the economy...’ and it is specifically 
intended that the aid should be used to help resolve structural 
adjustment problems.
In addition, the Lomé framework should be used to explore an 
EEC-ACP role in debt relief. At least half of the ACP states (in­
cluding one or more in each region) are severely debt distres­
sed. They cannot ever repay (or even pay interest on) their 
external debt unless they grow rapidly and they cannot grow 
rapidly (or even slowly) if they do service that debt.
It clearly requires a greater direct co-ordination between the 
national indicative programmes (NIP) under Lomé and the re­
construction and structural adjustment programmes of recipient
states. This co-ordination should extend beyond the EDF to food 
aid allocations. It should also make use of the regional dimen­
sion of Lomé to encourage regional solutions to the problems of
structural adjustment.
The external constraint on development will also be loosened 
by Lomé reforms that facilitate ACP trade export expansion.
These could include, for example, the simplifying and loosening 
of rules of origin, more concessions on products covered by the 
common agricultural policy (CAP), and co-ordination between the 
EC and ACP in the GATT round.
AGENDA FOR PRIORITY CHANGES 
IN LOME IV’
The following is a possible agenda and one relevant to needs 
and legitimate concerns of both sides. It is not an easy one be­
cause it requires major resource augmention as well as alloca- 
tional rethinking.
Resource transfers and economic 
reconstruction
A. The ACP/EEC relationship has always aspired to be more 
than an aid modality plus a trade insurance policy. To a degree 
is has succeeded. But for many ACP states net resource trans­
fers are the single most important aspect of the Conventions 
given that their principal exports would also enter the European 
market duty free without Lomé. This is even more true in today’s 
circumstances than before.
The minimum priority for 'Lomé IV’ is constant per capita real 
resource transfers under EDF to maintain the impetus of pre­
sent cooperation focused on agriculture, transport and other in­
frastructure. That will require a nominal increase of the order of 
50 % to off-set inflation and population growth.
B. But ‘Lomé IV' should respond to the entrenched crises now 
clutching most ACP states and dragging down their economies. 
Because one key element is import strangulation, it should inclu­
de substantial, additional quick disbursing resources usable as 
import support for key sectors. What goods for what sectors 
need to be mutually identified, with ACP countries concerned.
Funding of up to 3,000 million ECUs could be found as of 
1990 from unspent Lomé l-lll allocations. To the extent these 
were tied to ongoing projects, the projects (if the ACP state 
concerned desired) could be rolled forward to the 'Lomé IV’ 
country programme (NIP) clearing the balance for economic re­
suscitation via import support.
C. Production by poor people (both agricultural and urban in­
formal production -  especially by women) and access to Jiasic 
services (primary health care, education, water -  also of special 
value to women) are among the areas hardest hit by the crises 
and least well served by standard ‘stabilisation and structural 
adjustment’ programmes. But a concern either with economic ef­
ficiency present and future or with human rights requires giving 
priority to both. That was clearly demonstrated in the recent UN 
system ‘Human Dimension’ Conference in Khartoum and affir­
med in its closing declaration.
The key to unlocking Africa's hunger pattern lies in empowe­
ring poor rural households to grow enough to eat and poor ur­
ban households to earn enough to buy food. Because it is need 
-  for food, for fuel, for cash -  which is the dominant cause of 
environmental degradation in most ACP states, environmental 
protection requires that poor peasant households be enabled to 
produce less damagingly and that soil, water and tree conserva­
tion and reclamation economically be made viable for them. Simi­
larly, historically, falling infant mortality, rising female education, 
and improving nutritional standards are all preconditions with­
out which any population growth policy fails (unless based on 
brute force).
The existing human resources available to implement Lomé on 
both the EC and ACP sides are not necessarily the most appro­
priate for a strategy based on these objectives. Projects rele­
vant to poor people’s production and cost-effective access to 
basic services exist in significant numbers, but their design and 
implementation requires different skills than used in many 
conventional, large-scale infrastructure projects. To overcome 
such problems the EC and ACP should call upon the good offi­
ces of those organizations that do have experience in such an 
area to help articulate and implement more poverty-oriented pro­
grammes. These include a certain number of ACP states which 
do have experience in this area together with UNICEF, IFAD, and 
ILO/JASPA and some EC and ACP NGOs.
D. Food aid -  now linked to DG VIII -  should be more closely 
co-ordinated with reconstruction and development (as well as, 
at present, with emergency and survival) aspects of country pro­
grammes. Monetised food aid can provide counterpart local 
currency to complement EDF import component finance in pre­
sent indicative programmes and especially to above (C.) propo­
sed production by poor people/access to basic services focus. It 
shares this characteristic with the sectoral import support focus 
proposed above (B.) in which -  e.g. -  fertiliser sale proceeds 
could help local costs of -  e.g. -  rural roads and small scale irri­
gation schemes.
E. The EEC/ACP needs to address the central problem of at 
least half its membership that is not able to repay its external 
debt and grow rapidly at the same time. To be a serious contri­
bution, there must be a dialogue that goes beyond retrospective 
and prospective adjustments to European Investment Bank len- 
ding to debt distressed ACP. The dialogue should also provide a 
real forum, preferably a framework jointly agreed by EEC and 
ACP members, for seeking guidelines and co-ordinated actions 
for EC member state debt renegotiation and burden reduction 
with ACP states. It could usefully begin from proposals of the 
UN’s Wass Report and the OUA’s ‘common position’.
Elements should include:
•  rescheduling with extended grace and repayment periods plus 
reduced (say 2 % to 4 %) interest on the balances not writ­
ten off;
•  substantial writeoffs both of bilateral loans and guaranteed 
export credits to debt distressed ACP states;
•  cooperation in creative schemes to retire or refinance com­
mercial bank debt ad prices comparable to its real (secondary 
market) value rather than its unreal face amount.
F How should the Lomé Convention relate to the dialogue be­
tween many ACP states and the IMF/World Bank ? This ques­
tion is clearly of central importance for 'Lomé IV’ since the IM F/ 
World Bank will be pushing, and some ACP states will be 
adopting, economic policies that determine the environment 
within which Lomé aid activities will be implemented. Hence, if 
Lomé aid is to be successful it must take account in its design 
of the implications of the incorporation in national strategies of 
IMF/World Bank-approved policies.
Co-ordination between the EC, ACP and IMF/World Bank is the­
refore necessary; but this does not mean that the EC should 
adopt within the Lomé context identical positions to those ta­
ken up by the Bretton Woods institutions. This would represent 
a serious misallocation of EDF’s resources, and a waste of Lo- 
mé’s acquired strengths. The strength and vocation of the Lomé 
framework lie in its distinctive country and region focus and in 
the extent to which the Convention has been able to live up the 
rhetoric of a partnership’. National and regional indicative pro­
gramme co-ordination in respect to EDF should be primarily 
with recipient states and their regional organizations and only 
secondarily with other external sources of finance or purveyors 
of advice.
Trade -  access and development
G. Rules of origin remain complex, opaque and somewhat erra­
tic in results, especially for Caribbean and Pacific ACP states for 
whom the EEC is not a natural raw material product source. 
Similarly the unlimited, basically unconstrained safeguard provi­
sions (providing only for consultation with affected ACP states) 
do create uncertainty and deter investment.
Both areas deserve serious attention because specific, case by 
case improvements cumulatively of real value to many ACP 
economies should, with mutual goodwill, be attainable.
STABEX needs reconsideration. It was an innovation but one di­
rected to fluctuating commodity earnings not to the context of 
steadily declining commodity terms of trade and sluggish volume 
growth which has characterised 1980-87. One improvement 
would be to cover processed as well as raw forms of the com­
modities. Another would be greater EEC commitment to develo­
ping ways to halt terms of trade declines. This could include, 
but not be limited to, easing CAP barriers to access, to halting 
sugar, beef and other commodity dumping as part of CAP reform, 
and to a more creative approach to commodity agreements in 
selected products.
Assuming the present GATT round is successful from a South 
(including ACP) perspective, it will somewhat erode the value of 
preferential EEC market access to the ACP. That is a fact, but it 
does not mean that increasing the value of ‘Lomé IV’ and redu­
cing general access barriers to South exports should be assu­
med to be contradictory.
Rather, the EEC should undertake to consult with its ACP part­
ners as to their priorities for access improvement in OECD mar- 
kets generally and to take these into account in its negotiating 
priorities within GATT. ACP states do not export solely to the 
EEC -  nor would the EEC wish them to ! -  thus EEC support for 
their priorities in GATT can be worth more in general access 
gains than its cost in reduced EEC market preferences.
H. Support for regional cooperation among ACP states has
been one of the Lomé Convention’s distinctive and growth areas. 
Since Lomé III three EEC/ACP regional indicative programmes
analogous to national ones have been negotiated for ACP regio­
nal organizations, i.e. for the SADCC, CARICOM and Pacific Fo­
rum states. This approach should be institutionalised in ‘Lomé 
IV’ and -  to the extent possible -  generalised to the Western, 
Central and Eastern African regions.
Further, 'Lomé IV' could usefully include additional regional re­
source allocations to support intra-regional trade expansion.
These could finance pre-export import content finance and other 
revolving credit funds to facilitate getting such trade moving and 
to make the initial foreign exchange costs of expanding it more 
manageable.
The ACP states have consistently sought to build inter-regional 
cooperation. More recently they have identified concrete techni­
cal assistance and joint training programmes most effectively im- 
plementable at ACP level. An ACP inter-regional cooperation 
fund (and subsequently an indicative programme for its use) 
should therefore form a part of (and a new initiative in) 'Lomé IV’.
ACP enlargement can perhaps best be considered in a regional 
context, if the states of an ACP member regional organization 
desire a broader cooperation frame, and the EEC is willing to 
expand Lome resources to maintain their real per capita level, 
expansion may be desirable. The precedent is the agreement by 
the EEC on the initiative of the Southern African ACP members 
that Namibia, on independence, would be eligible for ACP mem­
bership. On that basis the Maldives (if the Indian Ocean ACP 
members so desired) and Haiti, the Dominican Republic and -  
perhaps -  mainland Central America (on CARICOM initiative) 
would be eligible. But ACP regional grouping support should be 
a precondition for all enlargement.
Human Rights: confronting apartheid aggression
Lomé III represents agreement on two principles: that human 
rights are a legitimate part of an economic cooperation Conven­
tion and that they must include the concerns of ACP states as 
well as those of EEC states. The clearest exemplification of the 
second principle are the provisions in respect to South Africa.
How ‘Lomé IV’ can go further on the general topic is not clear. 
The EEC is not the ideal arbiter of performance under the Afri­
can Charter on Human and People’s Rights. EEC states are 
not notably willing to accept an ACP/EEC role in reviewing hu­
man rights aspects of their immigration, resident alien and mi­
grant worker policies or practices nor of racism in Europe more 
generally. Cases of gross abuse in ACP states -  e.g. Bokassa, 
Macias Nguema, Amin -  could and would lead to action; in less 
clearcut cases neither the EEC nor the ACP is likely to agree on 
a common course of action. Exploration of common ground is 
worthwhile, but major procedural breakthroughs over 1988-90 
are by no means certain.
I. The area of opportunity is South Africa. It is a state founded 
on the denial of human rights. It illegally occupies what would 
otherwise be an ACP state -  Namibia. Its actions cost ACP sta­
tes thousands of millions of ECU’s and scores of thousands of 
human lives annually. Gross abuse and damage to the goals of 
ACP/EEC cooperation are nakedly evident.
Lomé III made a start on which ‘Lomé IV’ should build. Some 
building blocks include:
-  restatement of the present commitments to ending South Afri- 
can aggression, occupation^ of Namibia, and apartheid;
-  enhanced support to the Southern African ACP states priori­
ty programme for reduced dependence on and vulnerability to 
South Africa as set out in the SADCC (Southern African De­
velopment Coordination Conference) Programme of Action;
-  special assistance -  including but not limited to massive food 
aid to Angola and Mozambique -  to help offset the ravages of 
the South African armed forces and its proxies, and a clamp- 
down on European manifestations of these proxy forces -  no­
tably the so-called Renamo and UNITA -  which are by normal 
definition terrorist bands and little else;
-  enhanced support to Malawi to cope with the needs of the 
500,000 Mozambican refugees forced across its borders by 
proxy force terrorism;
-  material support for Southern African ACP state national and 
collective action to increase their security against the South 
African military and proxy forces;
-  enhanced material support to the refugee rehabilitation, edu­
cational and other nation building activities in exile of SWAPO 
and the ANC and -  if possible -  support for democratic orga­
nizations in Namibia and in South Africa committed to genui­
ne independence and to the end of apartheid;
-  actions to raise the costs to South Africa of continued regio­
nal aggression, illegal occupation of Namibia and maintenance 
of apartheid.
Duration and negotiating format
J. That 'Lomé IV' is likely to have direct descendants is presu­
mably universally accepted. That the Lomé II and III negotiations 
spent most of their time debating and re-adopting articles to 
which negligible substantive changes were made is well known 
to those involved in the negotiating processes. However, the pro­
posal that ‘Lomé IV’ consist of a Convention with indefinite 
(continuing) duration plus protocols (including EDF and other 
resource allocations) of five years duration poses real juridical 
and political problems for many ACP states.
How can one proceed on the agreed points while by-passing 
the formulation which causes problems ? One step would be a 
three way division of the Convention:
a. main articles on all topics including institutional, trade, re­
source transfers, intra-ACP cooperation, etc.
b. basic protocols providing for implementation of trade and re­
source transfer articles and of special emphases such as 
debt relief, food aid co-ordination with EDF indicative pro­
grammes, protection against South Africa;
c. special protocols subsidiary to articles or basic protocols, 
e.g. rules of origin, sugar, beef.
These could all be of five years duration, albeit for the main ar­
ticles 10 or 20 years might be more reasonable. As of 1990 the 
Lomé series will have lasted 15 years.
What matters is that there be procedural agreement th a t:
a. main articles will be renegotiated only to the extent that the­
re are substantive proposals for change backed by a signi­
ficant number of parties -  otherwise they will be re-adopted 
undebated;
b. basic protocols will need negotiation on numbers and -  more 
frequently than articles -  on programmatic or institutional subs­
tance. Additions and deletions are likely -  albeit if the basic 
trade and resource transfer ones could not be agreed, the 
main articles would become dead letters;
c. special protocols are for this purpose analogous to basic 
ones.
Such an approach would concentrate negotiating attention and- 
time on key issues of continuing or new programme levels, 
priorities and modalities. That, not the exact duration of the 
next Convention, is the priority goal and on that goal there is a 
common ACP/EEC interest.
Choose to go forward
The Lomé negotiating process should respond to changed 
contexts, needs and possibilities. But it should do so creatively 
building on the achieved strengths and uniquenesses of the 
ACP/EEC relationship and moving to develop new programmes 
of its own. It should not seek to become an identikit piece of 
approaches designed by others. The strategies and programmes 
to which it should primarily relate and with which it should be 
coordinated are those of the ACP partner states.
That means greater co-ordination of EDF and food aid; specific 
attention to production by and access to basic services of 
poor people; furthering intra-ACP cooperation regionally and in- 
tra-regionally. It also means broader trade liberalisation and de­
velopment plus the sharpening and enhancing of the human 
rights/economic protection focus with respect to South Africa. 
Institutional and negotiating changes should serve those substanti­
ve ends.
Achieving these priorities will require a doubling of resources 
-  perhaps one half from a 50 % increase in the new EDF and 
half from use of unspent balances plus additional food aid. Nei­
ther the programmes nor the funding will be easy to negotiate 
but they are both needed and possible and, therefore, well 
worth struggling for.
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